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BIG THREE STRIVE AT POTSDAM TO UNIFY POLICY ON GERMANY

REPORTED contrasts in the policies the Allies have been pursuing in their respective zones of defeated Germany should cause no surprise, since no joint over-all policy for the control of Germany has thus far been established. It must be hoped that the Big Three conference which opened at Potsdam on July 16 will issue a joint directive speeding the establishment of the Allied Control Council for Germany and giving this body sufficient power to coordinate basic plans for all four Allied military zones. In judging newspaper reports from all zones in Germany, it must be borne in mind that reporters do not have full access to information, and are not always aware of the military necessities that may have prompted this or that measure.

NAZIS AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE. One fundamental point, on which all the occupying authorities in Germany will have to reach approximately the same conclusion if they are to pursue common policies is the long-debated question whether the Nazis alone or the entire German people should be held responsible for Hitler's aggressions. During the earlier stages of the war both Britain and the United States tended to regard Nazism as the principal enemy in Germany. But the prolonged fighting and the revelation of Nazi atrocities during the concluding months of the war combined to strengthen the view that the German people shared the guilt of their leaders. It was in a mood of anger and disgust with all Germans that Marshal Montgomery ordered his troops to "behave as conquerors" after V-E Day, while General Clay, General Eisenhower's deputy, declared that the purpose of the Allies' military government was "to punish Germany and hold her down."

By contrast, the Russians, who have at least as many reasons as the British and Americans to hate the Germans, are carefully distinguishing between

the Nazis and the average German. Even before the Red Army entered Berlin, Russia made it clear that it would not regard Nazis and Germans as identical—a theory strongly propounded during the war by the Russian writer Ilya Ehrenburg. Instead, the Russians emphasized the view Stalin had formulated early in the war when he declared that the object of Russia was to destroy Nazism, not the German people. The actions of Soviet officials in Russian-occupied areas of Germany indicate two things: first, Russia wants to reduce its military responsibilities in Germany as soon as possible and realizes that a stable and friendly German government is essential to this plan. Second, the Russians have been seriously disturbed by the mass flight of civilians from their zone during the last phases of the war and are trying to dissipate the fears of the Germans.

ANGLO-AMERICAN NEGATIVES. Meanwhile, the emphasis the United States and Britain have been placing on their role as conquerors makes their tasks of military government more difficult than those of the Red Army. The lifting, on July 14, of the ban on fraternization should help to end the social vacuum that has hitherto existed in the American and British controlled areas. This step has been taken, it is officially stated, because Nazis are being rapidly rounded up, and security reasons no longer require non-communication between Allied forces and the German population. This ban, however, was only the most publicized, and the most frequently violated, of a long list of negative commands given to American and British forces in Germany. In addition, the occupying authorities are under orders not to permit the existence of any political party, with the result that no new groups are emerging to replace the Nazis. In areas, such as Bavaria, where faint signs of reviving political activity have appeared, they have been promptly suppressed.

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The Anglo-American policy of suspending normal life in Germany has also led to bans on public gatherings and on publications, which are now being somewhat modified. The problems of resuming economic activities, too, have been faced chiefly from the negative angle of what industries and types of work are forbidden. As a result, western Germany is threatened with mass-unemployment and serious food shortages which could lead to disorders; and disorders, in turn, might lead to new prohibitions.

RUSSIAN POLICY OF RECONSTRUCTION.

In the Russian zone, on the other hand, where non-Nazi Germans are regarded by the Red Army as potential friends, definite encouragement is being given to the revival of political, economic and cultural life. Anti-fascist political parties have been organized, the formation of a united front of four parties has just been announced in Berlin, and trade unions have been revived. Movies, theatres and concert halls have been reopened, with the Russians paying their respects to the German culture of the past. Reconstruction tasks, for which workers are drafted, have begun in the cities, and several thousand urban dwellers have been sent to farms to help restock eastern Germany's food basket. Moreover, partly as a result of the fact that the Russian zone has a comparatively small population and possesses larger agricultural resources, the Red Army has been able to announce an increase in German rations that will give workers greater amounts of food than they had under the Nazis.

The Russians' emphasis on reconstruction does not mean, however, that the Red Army is offering a "soft" peace to Germany. In addition to the obviously constructive side of the picture of German life in the Russian zone, there are punitive measures that

may offset somewhat any hopes the Germans may have for national restitution under Russian leadership. For example, Soviet authorities have been removing large amounts of machinery to Russian factories, thus obtaining reparations for the U.S.S.R. before the inter-Allied reparations committee in Moscow has officially announced its plans. Yet to the defeated Germans the policies of the Russian occupying authorities may seem to give Germany, as the Red Army claims, a chance to find its way back into the comity of nations.

DANGEROUS COMPETITION. Since a marked contrast exists between the Anglo-American and Russian zones, there is inevitably an element of competition for German support in the Red Army's more positive strategy of occupation. The Western powers cannot ignore the dangers of such competition, and for this reason—if no other—they need to reexamine their current policies toward Germany.

This does not mean, however, as some observers in this country and Britain are suggesting, that the American and British occupying authorities must try to build up a western Germany that will take its cue from Washington and London. Such a plan, if it succeeded, would almost surely cause Russia to extend its security demands still further. If it failed, Britain and the United States would find themselves virtually restricted to the fringes of western Europe, and further attempts to cooperate with Russia would be jeopardized. Instead of seeking a solution of the German problem in such an obviously dangerous plan, further attempts must be made to organize Germany under united Allied control despite the physical division of the country into zones of occupation.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

RUSSIA RESUMES HISTORIC ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST

Predictions abound that every question currently vexing the Allies will be raised at the Potsdam conference. Joint decisions by the Big Three are indeed urgently needed concerning many issues aside from the problems of joint occupation of Germany. Among these are frontier quarrels in the Balkans, rising tension in Greece, control of the Dardanelles, and territorial or political demands presented by Russia to Turkey and Iran. It is doubtful, however, that more than tentative plans can be made at this time for a coming peace conference to deal with many of these developments. Some problems confronting the Allies in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East grow out of the European war. Others reflect long-term strategic or geographic interests and demonstrate clearly that the Soviet government intends to recover the position Russia held in world affairs under the Czars.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN STRAINS. At Teheran agree-

ment was reached between Britain and Russia recognizing Greece as in the British sphere of influence. But despite the Soviet Union's hands-off policy thus far in Greece, events there are perhaps the most likely to lead to serious deterioration of Anglo-Russian relations. Recent reports indicate that Greece faces a virtual state of terror, allegedly instigated by pro-monarchist elements which control the British-sponsored government. Greek irredentists have recently made extravagant claims about the country's borders, and it is to be noted that pro-communist elements have taken up these requests, asking also for Eastern Thrace. While the Greek Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, charges that Greek subjects are maltreated in a small sector of Albania, the Yugoslav leader, Marshal Tito in a statement of July 8 attacked Greece, and may hope to incorporate Macedonia, with its valuable Aegean port of Salonika, in the projected Yugoslav state or at least in the pro-

posed South Slav federation which is backed by Russia. On July 11 Russian troops were said to have drawn up to the Greek-Bulgarian border where incidents, as in Macedonia, are reported.

Only if the Big Three conferees at Potsdam devise binding and realistic plans for cooperative supervision of the coming plebiscites in Greece and Yugoslavia would there seem to be hope of assuring stability in Southeastern Europe. Otherwise, if the Soviet Union now decides openly to support political groups in Greece to which Britain has heretofore objected, there is little doubt that Russian interests will conflict with those of the present British government which will surely continue to pursue vigorously its policy of retaining a hold on Greek affairs. Britain has sponsored, jointly with the Soviet Union, the leftist regime of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia and must now anticipate greater Russian influence in the Dardanelles, as well as in the Middle East generally. The expansion of Russian influence in this region, however, will render Britain's position extremely precarious in the eastern Mediterranean unless the Aegean approaches to Britain's empire lifeline like Crete are fully protected.

RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST. In both Turkey and Iran Moscow's demands clearly reflect the permanent geographical realities of the area and Russia's security needs. Moscow's desire for bases near the Dardanelles and a privileged position in the Montreux regime governing the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were presented formally to Turkey on June 22 and announced in the press on June 25. Although these demands have been rumored for several months, since Russia denounced the Soviet-Turkish neutrality pact of 1925 on March 20, it has been apparent that relations between the two countries could only be regularized after clarification of the Montreux convention. Although the straits were demilitarized by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, Turkey obtained the right to militarize the area when the Montreux convention was signed in 1936.

With respect to the administration of the straits, as with respect to Tangiers, Britain will doubtless accept increased Russian participation. Yet in view of its alliance with Turkey of 1939, Britain will back the Turkish claim that any change in the Dardanelles must be undertaken under international auspices, and that the problem of the straits is not to be dealt with bilaterally between Turkey and Russia. Turkey is expected to resist the additional

Russian demands made known on June 25 for strategic bases and for annexation of the former Russian provinces of Kars and Ardahan. These provinces, of some strategic importance since they lie near the juncture of Turkey, Iran and the U.S.S.R., were given up by the Soviet government under the Brest-Litovsk settlement of 1918. Their incorporation in Turkey was accomplished in the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1921. Recent precedents in eastern Europe, however, suggest that after prolonged negotiation and after the great powers have adjusted their claims with respect to the Dardanelles, Kars and Ardahan will be returned to the Soviet Union. Here, above all, Moscow's policy seems to be motivated by an attempt to rectify the terms imposed on a gravely weakened Russia at the time when it withdrew from World War I.

In Iran attention centers on the withdrawal of Allied troops from that country in conformity with the pledge to respect Iran's independence, given by the Big Three at Teheran in 1943. Troops were to be withdrawn within six months after the end of the war, and on July 14 London reported that Britain had proposed withdrawal of British and Russian forces in the near future. Virtually all American military personnel in the country had already been evacuated. More significant, however, is the continued Russian press campaign against the present Iranian government. Last autumn the U.S.S.R. was balked in obtaining oil and other mineral concessions in northern Iran, although its demand led to the downfall of the government, which has since undergone further changes. Now *Pravda* on July 9 has urged that the government be reformed once more. In Iran, perhaps more than in any other Middle Eastern state, the Soviet Union can hope to benefit from internal political pressures. Certain leftist groups in Iran, although less well organized than in eastern Europe, have taken up the plea for a pro-Russian policy on the part of the Iranian government. Whatever agreement is reached to withdraw military forces in Iran, British control of the Persian Gulf and Anglo-American oil concessions in the southern provinces will inevitably stimulate Russia's desire for greater participation in Iranian affairs.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

The Speeches of General de Gaulle. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$1.75


This compilation of speeches made between June 18, 1940 and December 28, 1942 reveals the intense belief and fixed purpose of the French leader.

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Washington News Letter



JAPAN SEES ITS ONLY HOPE IN ALLIED RIFT ON CHINA

The conclusion on July 13 of two weeks of talks in Moscow between Marshal Stalin and T. V. Soong, Premier of China, has brought the United States to a critical point in its Chinese policy, which might undergo radical change at the Potsdam conference. The Moscow conversations, which reportedly arrived at no conclusion, dashed Washington's hopes that the rival governments of China in Chungking and Yen'an would voluntarily unite in a combined regime. The possibilities either that the Soviet Union will agree explicitly to take part in the Far Eastern war or that Japan, whose mainland is now subjected to shelling from United States warships, will sue for surrender make the problem of Chinese internal political division particularly urgent for the Truman administration. China poses the one important issue in the world that could prevent the United States from establishing long-term good relations with the U.S.S.R.

ASIATIC PROBLEMS AT POTSDAM. Through Ambassador W. Averell Harriman the United States followed the Soong conversations with the serious hope that they would bring agreement between the Soviet Union and the Chungking government, which Soong represents, on two outstanding issues—the territorial integrity of northern China and the reorganization of the central government. Soong and Stalin apparently reached no agreement on either issue, although the door to future negotiation remains open. Indifference on Moscow's part toward the attainment of political unity in China, or continuing reluctance on the part of Chungking to seek such unity would jeopardize our present policy and could create a gulf between this country and Russia. The policy of the United States currently is to cooperate with the central government, which maintains a military blockade along the borders of the Yen'an territories controlled by the Communists, and gently urge that government to reach an understanding with its northern rival.

Truman and his advisers on Chinese affairs went to Potsdam with the realization that the United States must be ready to modify its strictly correct policy of dealing only with the recognized government of China. In the absence of Chinese unity, the United States has to decide whether it should grant military assistance to the Yen'an government, whose troops are fighting the Japanese separately from the central government troops. This decision is of crucial

importance if Russia plans to fight Japan. For Red Army forces advancing southward into free China from Siberia against the Japanese would enter first the region controlled by the Yen'an regime, and military necessity, if no other reason, would drive the Russians to cooperate with that regime. Even if Russia does not enter the Far Eastern war, it will retain its political interest in northern China, a border zone, and that interest, it is expected, will lead to sympathetic relations with the Yen'an regime. Support of rival Chinese factions by the United States and the Soviet Union could lead to dangerous conflict between the two great powers. It should be noted that Chungking has recently manifested coolness toward internal pressure for unity. Chow Ping-Ling, speaking on July 8 to the Peoples' Political Council meeting in Chungking, advocated cooperation between Chungking and Yen'an. On July 9 he protested that official censorship had deleted his remarks from the newspapers.

JAPANESE HOPES AROUSED. The prospect of a disagreement between Russia and the United States over China is buoying Japan's hopes in the grim days of its military decline. Kusuo Oya, chief of the editorial department of the Tokyo radio, said in a broadcast on July 9: "No battle beyond Okinawa can be planned by America without expecting some collision in one form or another, directly or indirectly, with the Soviet interests in Asia . . . Japan has confidence enough in its ability to expect a dramatic turn of events in the Pacific, and it is of small concern to the Japanese, and to their advantage, if nobody can understand such confidence."

This broadcast brings back vivid memories of the situation that existed in Germany on the eve of its defeat. In Germany, as in Japan, political leaders expressed utmost confidence—a confidence difficult for non-Germans to understand at that time—that some miracle would save the Reich in the nick of time. German spokesmen, like those of Japan, looked for that miracle to be produced by a clash between the United States and Britain, on the one hand, and Russia on the other. An American-Russian misunderstanding today regarding relations with China would only redound to the ultimate advantage of Japan—as a similar misunderstanding about Europe would, before V.E. Day, have redounded to the advantage of Germany.

BLAIR BOLLES

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